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Abstract—In proxy re-encryption (PRE), a proxy with
re-encryption keys can transfer a ciphertext computed
under Alice’s public key into a new one, which can be de-
crypted by Bob only with his secret key. Recently, Wang
et al. introduced the concept of PRE plus (PRE+) scheme,
which can be seen as the dual of PRE, and is almost the
same as PRE scheme except that the re-encryption keys
are generated by the encrypter. Compared to PRE, PRE+
scheme can easily achieve this important property: the
message-level based ﬁne-grained delegation. In this paper,
we extend the concept of PRE+ to the identity based
setting. We propose a concrete IBPRE+ scheme based on
3-linear map and roughly discuss its properties. We also
demonstrate potential application of this new primitive
to secure cloud data sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [1] proposed
the concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE), where a
semi-trusted proxy can transform a ciphertext for Alice
into another ciphertext that Bob can decrypt. However,
the proxy can learn nothing about the corresponding
plaintext. According to the direction of transformation,
PRE schemes can be classiﬁed into two types, name-
ly, bi-directional or uni-directional. A PRE scheme
is called bidirectional if the proxy can use the re-
encryption key to divert ciphertexts from Alice to Bob
and vice-versa. Otherwise, it is called unidirectional.
In unidirectional PRE schemes, the proxy can only
transform in one direction. Blaze et al. [1] also gave
another method to classify PRE schemes, called multi-
use, i.e., the ciphertext can be transformed from Alice
to Bob to Charlie and so on; and single-use, i.e., the
ciphertext can be transformed only once.
Due to its transformation property, PRE schemes can
be used in many applications,including simpliﬁcation
of key distribution [1], key escrow [2], distributed ﬁle
systems [3], [4], multicast [5], anonymous communi-
cation [6], DFA-based FPRE system [7], and cloud
computation [8], [9]. Recently, the research of cloud
email system has become more and more popular in
business and organizations as it allows an enterprise
to rent the cloud SaaS service to build an email
system with less costs and maintenance efforts. Indeed,
it is much cheaper and scalable than traditional on-
premises solution [10]–[13]. However, these solutions
have a common drawback: the grant of content sharing
capability, which is achieved through the generation of
re-encryption key. Up to now, in all of the traditional
identity based proxy re-encryption schemes, the gener-
ation of re-encryption key is generally divided into two
ways: in uni-directional proxy re-encryption scheme,
the key is generated by an authorized person A; in
bi-directional scheme, it is generated by A and the
recipient B [14]. Recently, Wang et al. [15] proposed
a new scheme for the re-encryption key generation,
where the key is generated by the sender S. This way
has the advantage that the sender S can control the
authorization granting process by using the random
number, which is used in the encryption process to
generate the proxy re-encryption key.
In this work, we propose a new identity based proxy
re-encryption system. In the new identity based proxy
encryption system, the re-encryption key is generated
by the sender S, and the process of agency is controlled
by S thoroughly. This method can avoid the ﬂaw of
the traditional proxy re-encryption, the sender S can
control the people who can get the message and the
sharing content of the messages.
A. Our Contribution
In this paper, based on Wang et al. ’s proposal [15]
and 3-linear map introduced in [17], we propose the
IBPRE+ scheme by using identity based encryption
and 3-linear map, and analyse the proposal’s property.
Toward this construction, we ﬁrst review the IBE
scheme, and then we construct a new IBE scheme
based on 3-linear Map. Based on that scheme, we
propose our IBPRE+ scheme. We roughly discuss
the properties of our IBPRE+ scheme. Finally, we
demonstrate the potential application of our scheme
to secure cloud data sharing.
B. Organization
We organize this paper as follows. In Section II, we
ﬁrst review the IBE scheme; secondly, we propose a
new IBE scheme based on 3-linear map; then, we give
our IBPRE+ proposal and roughly discuss its proper-
ties. In Section III, we demonstrate the application of
our scheme. In the last Section IV, we conclude our
paper.
II. OUR PROPOSED IBPRE+ SCHEME
A. Review of the BB1 IBE Scheme
1) SetUp(1k). Let G,GT be a bilinear group of
prime order p, and e : G × G → GT be the
bilinear map. Given a security parameter 1k as
input, select a random generator g and h, g2 ∈ G.
Pick α ∈ Z∗p and set g1 = gα.
MK = α, Pub = (g, g1, g2, h)
Let MK be a master secret key, and Pub be the
public parameters.
2) KeyGen(MK,Pub, ID). Given master secret
key MK = α, public parameters Pub and an
identity ID as input, the PKG picks u ∈ Z∗p and
output an IBE secret key as
SK = (sk1, sk2) = (g
α
2 (g
ID
1 h)
u, gu)
3) Encrypt(ID, Pub,M ). Given an identity ID,
public parameter Pub and plaintext M ∈ GT
as input, select w ∈ Z∗p and output an IBE
ciphertext C.
C = (C1, C2, C3) = (g
ω, (gID1 h)
ω,Me(g1, g2)
ω)
4) Decrypt(SK,Pub, C). Given an IBE secret key
SK, public parameters Pub and an IBE cipher-
text CI as input, output a plaintext M .
M =
C3e(sk2, C2)
e(sk1, C1)
B. New IBE Scheme Based on 3-linear Map
1) SetUp(1k). Let (G1, G2, G3) be 3-linear groups
of prime order p, and let g be a generator of G1.
In addition, let ea,b : Ga×Gb → Ga+b(a+b ≤ 3)
denote the 3-linear map. Given a security param-
eter 1k as input, select a random generator g11
and h11, g12 ∈ G1. Pick α ∈ Z∗p and set g13 =
gα11. Let e11(g12, g13) = g21, e21(g21, g11) =
g31.
MK = α, Pub = (g11, g12, g13, h11, g21, g31)
Let MK be a master secret key, and Pub be the
public parameters.
2) KeyGen(MK,Pub, ID). Given master secret
key MK = α, public parameters Pub and an
identity ID as input, the PKG picks u ∈ Z∗p and
output an IBE secret key as
SK = (sk1, sk2) = (g
α
12(g
ID
13 h11)
u, gu11)
3) Encrypt(ID, Pub,M ). Given an identity ID,
public parameter Pub and plaintext M ∈ GT
as input, select w ∈ Z∗p and output an IBE
ciphertext C.
C = (C1, C2, C3, C4)
= (gω11, (g
ID
13 h11)
ω,Mgωt31 , g
t
11)
4) Decrypt(SK,Pub, C). Given an IBE secret key
SK, public parameters Pub and an IBE cipher-
text CI as input, output a plaintext M .
M =
C3
A
,A = e21(
e(sk2, C2)
e(sk1, C1)
, C4)
= e21(e11(g12, g13)
ω, gt11) = e21(g
ω
21, g
t
11)
= gωt31
C. New IBE Scheme Based on 3-linear Map with Fixed
Randomness
1) SetUp(1k). Let (G1, G2, G3) be 3-linear groups
of prime order p, and let g be a generator of G1.
In addition, let ea,b : Ga×Gb → Ga+b(a+b ≤ 3)
denote the 3-linear map. Given a security param-
eter 1k as input, select a random generator g11
and h11, g12 ∈ G1. Pick α ∈ Z∗p and set g13 =
gα11. Let e11(g12, g13) = g21, e21(g21, g11) =
g31.
MK = α, Pub = (g11, g12, g13, h11, g21, g31)
Let MK be a master secret key, and Pub be the
public parameters.
2) KeyGen(MK,Pub, ID). Given master secret
key MK = α, public parameters Pub and an
identity ID as input, the PKG picks u ∈ Z∗p and
output an IBE secret key as
SK = (sk1, sk2) = (g
α
12(g
ID
13 h11)
u, gu11)
3) Encrypt(ID, Pub,M ). Given an identity ID,
public parameter Pub and plaintext M ∈ GT
as input, select a ﬁxed random number r ∈ Z∗p
and a random number w ∈ Z∗p and output an
IBE ciphertext C.
C = (C1, C2, C3, C4)
= (grω11 , (g
ID
13 h11)
rω,Mgrωt31 , g
t
11)
4) Decrypt(SK,Pub, C). Given an IBE secret key
SK, public parameters Pub and an IBE cipher-
text C as input, output a plaintext M .
M =
C3
A
,A = e21(
e(sk2, C2)
e(sk1, C1)
, C4)
= e21(e11(g12, g13)
rω, gt11)
= e21(g
rω
21 , g
t
11) = g
rωt
31
D. IBPRE+ Scheme Based on 3-linear Map with Fixed
Randomness
1) SetUp(1k). Let (G1, G2, G3) be 3-linear groups
of prime order p, and let g be a generator of G1.
In addition, let ea,b : Ga×Gb → Ga+b(a+b ≤ 3)
denote the 3-linear map. Given a security param-
eter 1k as input, select a random generator g11
and h11, g12 ∈ G1. Pick α ∈ Z∗p and set g13 =
gα11. Let e11(g12, g13) = g21, e21(g21, g11) =
g31.
MK = α, Pub = (g11, g12, g13, h11, g21, g31)
Let MK be a master secret key, and Pub be the
public parameters.
2) KeyGen(MK,Pub, ID1). Given master secret
key MK = α, public parameters Pub and an
identity ID1 as input, the PKG picks u ∈ Z∗p
and output an IBE secret key as
SKID1 = (sk1, sk2) = (g
α
12(g
ID1
13 h11)
u, gu11)
3) Encrypt(ID1, Pub,M ). Given an identity ID1,
public parameter Pub and plaintext M ∈ GT as
input, select a ﬁxed random number r ∈ Z∗p and
a random number w ∈ Z∗p and output an IBE
ciphertext C.
C = (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)
= (grω11 , (g
ID1
13 h11)
rω,Mgrωt31 , g
t
11, g
ωt
12 )
We can see the encrypter can decrypt the
ciphertext by using gr11 and computing
e21(e11(C5, g13), g
r
11) = e21(g
ωt
21 , g
r
11) = g
rωt
31 .
4) ReKeyGen(Pub, rID1 , ID1, ID2). On input the
delegator’s identity ID1, delegatee’s identity
ID2, public parameter Pub, the encrypter’s ﬁxed
randomness r for ID1, the encrypter generates
the re-encryption key as following:
rkID1→ID2 = (rk1, rk2, rk3)
= (g−r11 H(X)
y, gy13, IBEID2(X))
where H : {0, 1}∗ → G1.
5) Reencrypt(Pub, C, r, ID1, ID2). On input the
delegator’s second level ciphertext and the re-
encryption key, the proxy does the following:
C ′ = (C ′1, C
′
2, C
′
3, C
′
4)
= (C3e21(e11(C5, rk1), g13), rk2 = g
y
13,
C5 = g
ωt
12 , IBEID2(X))
= (Me(H(X)y, gωt12 , g13), g
y
13, g
ωt
12 ,
IBEID2(X))
6) Decrypt2(SKID1 , Pub, C). Given an IBE secret
key SK, public parameters Pub and an IBE
ciphertext C as input, output a plaintext M .
M =
C3
A
,A = e21(
e(sk2, C2)
e(sk1, C1)
, C4)
= e21(e11(g12, g13)
rω, gt11)
= e21(g
rω
21 , g
t
11) = g
rωt
31
7) Decrypt1(SKID2 , Pub, C ′). ID2 ﬁrst decrypt
C ′4 = IBEID2(X) to get H(X) and then
compute
A = e(C ′3, H(X), C
′
2)
= e(gy13, H(X), g
ωt
12 ),M = C
′
1/A
E. Property Analysis
Here we discuss our IBPRE+ scheme’s property.
According to the properties deﬁned in [4], our scheme
has the following properties:
1) Uni-directional: In our scheme, all of the re-
encryption key is generated by the data sender
S, so delegation from A → B does not allow
re-encryption from B → A.
2) Non-interactive: The re-encryption keys can be
generated by Alice using Bob’s public key; no
trusted third party or interaction is required.
3) Non-transitive: The proxy cannot re-delegate de-
cryption rights. Because the proxy cannot get any
information about the sender’s private key, so he
cannot produce rka→c from rka→b and rkb→c .
4) Message level based delegation: in our scheme,
the encrypter can easily control which message
shall be delegated by the proxy. For example, for
rkID1→ID2 = (g
−r
11 H(X)
y, gy13, IBEID2(X)),
if the encrypter wants to share the message with
the delegatee, then he encrypts the message with
randomness r, otherwise he encrypts message
with other randomness. In this way our scheme
can achieve message level based delegation.
5) Weak non-transferability: The proxy and a set of
colluding delegatees cannot re-delegate decryp-
tion rights for all the ciphertexts of the delegator.
For instance, from rka→b, skb, pkc, although
they can produce rka→c for ﬁxed randomness r,
but they can not produce rka→c for other cipher-
texts not using randomness r, which partially
solve the non-transferability.
III. IBPRE+ FOR SECURE CLOUD DATA SHARING
Based on our proposal, we can design a scheme
useful for secure content sharing applications in Cloud.
Thus, IBPRE+ for secure cloud data sharing frame-
work consists of the following algorithms: system
initialization, key generation, data storage, data autho-
rization and data recovery.
1) System initialization. First, the PKG selects a
security parameter. On input the security pa-
rameter, the PKG generates some corresponding
public parameters, which are outsourced to the
system management Cloud server for other data
users to share.
2) Key generation. The PKG generates the data
owner and data users’ private key by using the
system parameters, user’s identity and master
secret key. Then, PKG sends the private key to
the users via a secure channel.
3) Data store. When data owner Alice wants to
outsource her private social multimedia content
such as pictures, to the cloud, she ﬁrst encrypts
the pictures with ciphers suitable for JPEG or
video encryption, and then encrypts the cipher’s
key with our IBPRE+ scheme; ﬁnally, she out-
sources all the ciphertexts to the cloud storage
server. Of course, the integrity of the outsourced
data will be ensured by other techniques like
provable data position, etc.
4) Data sharing. When data owner Alice want
to share her personal pictures with her close
friend Bob, she ﬁrst generates the re-encryption
keys for Bob by using Bob’s identity, public
parameters and her secret key, then outsource
them to the cloud. The cloud storage server
retrieves Alice’s outsourced encrypted ﬁle, and
then implements the re-encryption algorithm to
send the re-encrypted ciphertext to Bob.
5) Data recovery. After receiving the re-encrypted
ciphertexts, data sharer Bob decrypts them by
using his own private key, thus he will get the
cipher key for the pictures. Then, he requires to
the cloud also to send him the encrypted pictures,
and by using the retrieved cipher key, he can
decrypt them to get the pictures.
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Fig. 1. Identity based proxy re-encryption plus for secure cloud
data sharing
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new primitive, called
IBPRE+, which is an identity based proxy re-
encryption (PRE) scheme and propose the construc-
tion of such a concrete scheme. It can be seen as
the dual of the traditional identity based proxy re-
encryption. In the scheme, the data owner can control
sharing capability in a ﬂexible way by using random
numbers used in the encryption process. Compared to
traditional identity based proxy re-encryption schemes,
our scheme has some advantages, and can be more
appropriately adapted to some applications for content
sharing, such as secure cloud data sharing. In our future
research work, we would like to explore other aspects,
such as giving formal security proof for our proposal,
proposing more efﬁcient schemes and implement the
schemes in real Cloud environments, etc.
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